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辽宁大学 法学院,辽宁 沈阳 110035
Received:04 March 2021,
Revised:15 April 2021,
Published:30 September 2021
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董世坤.金融领域中央与地方政府的行为逻辑及关系协调 [J]. 山西农业大学学报(社会科学版),2021,20(5):71⁃80.
DONG Shikun.Behavioral logic and relationship coordination between central and local governments in financial field [J]. Journal of Shanxi Agricultural University(Social Science Edition),2021,20(5):71⁃80.
董世坤.金融领域中央与地方政府的行为逻辑及关系协调 [J]. 山西农业大学学报(社会科学版),2021,20(5):71⁃80. DOI: 10.13842/j.cnki.issn1671-816X.2021.05.009.
DONG Shikun.Behavioral logic and relationship coordination between central and local governments in financial field [J]. Journal of Shanxi Agricultural University(Social Science Edition),2021,20(5):71⁃80. DOI: 10.13842/j.cnki.issn1671-816X.2021.05.009.
我国金融领域的制度变迁中,中央与地方政府的行为选择发挥着重要作用。中央政府在金融权力领域的选择性政策制定与动态调适,主要基于中央内部政策目标的冲突与平衡、金融分权的政治需求、金融事权中央主导性坚持的行为逻辑。地方政府对金融发展、金融监管的态度及行为选择亦受到诸多因素的影响,例如地方政府官员的个人因素,地方政治传统的影响,地方制度环境与改革舆论压力,地方政府谈判资本的多寡,地方政策选择的政治风险与试错风险权衡等。多重因素之下,中央与地方在金融领域的关系变得更为复杂,呈现出分权、合作、互补关系,以及地方的灵活性执行与中央的选择性控制的博弈状况。因此,法律规范之外,政府间行事规则、惯例和非正式协调活动组合应对央地金融权力关系调整发挥作用。
The behavior choice of central and local governments plays an important role in the institutional change of China's financial field. The selective policy formulation and dynamic adjustment of the central government in the field of financial power are mainly based on the conflict and balance of the internal policy objectives of the central government, the political demand of financial decentralization, and the behavioral logic of the central leadership of financial authority. The attitude and behavior of local government to financial development and financial supervision are also influenced by many factors, such as the personal factors of local government officials; The influence of local political traditions; Local system environment and public opinion pressure of reform; The amount of negotiating capital of the local government; The balance of political risk and trial⁃and⁃error risk of local policy choice. Under multiple factors, the relationship between the central and local governments in the financial field has become more complex, showing decentralization, cooperation and complementarity, as well as the game situation between the flexible implementation of local governments and the selective control of the central government.Therefore, in addition to legal norms, intergovernmental rules of conduct, conventions and informal coordination activities should play a role in the adjustment of central and local financial power relations.
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